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Book Review
THE LAW OF OBSCENITY. By Frederick F. Schauer.1 Washington, D.C.:
The Bureau of National Affairs, Inc. (1976). Pp. x, 459. $19.50.
The Law of Obscenity is a heavily referenced treatise designed
to assist judges who interpret obscenity laws, legislators who
write such laws, prosecutors who enforce them, and private
attorneys whose legal practice involves such laws.
Professor Schauer has drawn upon his practical experience as
a private practitioner in the obscenity law field and as a profes-
sor of constitutional law and evidence to develop this limited but
confused, vague and difficult area of the law. The result is a
practical "How to . . ." book which carefully develops each
aspect of the United States Supreme Court tests for the regula-
tion of obscenity. The book's strongest point is its abundant use
of citations to the decisions of lower federal courts and state
courts in order to illustrate how Supreme Court decisions have
been perceived by those courts. Relevant books and law review
articles are also noted. The references are so complete that the
book would be valuable for this reason alone.
In the book, the author first develops the substantive law of
obscenity and then discusses procedural aspects of obscenity
regulation with helpful advice on such things as the use of expert
1. Associate Professor, West Virginia University College of Law.
witnesses, pretrial motions, and jury selection. Additional mate-
rial is included in five appendices, the last of which contains the
full opinions of eleven major United States Supreme Court ob-
scenity cases.2 Also included are examples of voir dire ques-
tions,3 jury instructions, and typical forms as well as the texts of
major statutes.
The analysis of substantive law begins with an examination of
the tests developed by the Supreme Court. Millerv. California's4
tripartite test was an attempt to clarify the law of obscenity.
Professor Schauer rejects as inadequate the various attempts to
define the first part of the Miller test, appeal to the prurient
interest.5 Only by looking at the precedents does one begin to
understand what the court has in mind, he says, and then only in
a negative sense. Material appealing to the prurient interest is
something other than profanity, nudity, the sexually explicit or
the advocacy of any sexual activity or sex-related idea.6 What it is
not is clear. Sex per se is not only not punishable, it is entitled to
the highest degree of protection because of its relationship to
fundamental interest.7
Next, there is the "average man" concept originated by the
2. Of landmark obscenity cases decided at the time of publication, only
Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965) is omitted. The text, however, has an
excellent discussion of Freedman particularly in its application of the principal
of Freedman and Carroll v. President and Commissioner of Princess Anne, 393
U.S. 175 (1968) to the use of injunctions against obscene materials. (See summary
at page 238.) Also good is the related discussion of search and seizure as a form of
prior restraint. (See summary at page 212.)
3. Appendix A lists 56 questions (some with multiple parts) for voir dire
examination of prospective jurors. The first eight questions are very general; the
remainder deal primarily with sexual attitudes. Number 27 is illustrative: "Does
the idea of sex between humans and animals offend you." In view of the fact that
the first 56 questions cover everything except whether the prospective juror owns
a water bed, it is perhaps unfortunate that it is the last question which asks, "Are
you embarassed when you talk about sex?"
4. 413 U.S. 15 (1973)
5. Probably, the most common definitions are found in footnote 20 of Roth
v. United States, 354 U.S. 476,487 (1957), i.e., "material having a tendency to excite
lustful thoughts," material appealing to a "shameful or morbid interest in nudity,
sex, or excretion." Other courts have defined it as relating to "lecherous thoughts
or desires" or catering to "a loose-lipped sensual leer."
6. Professor Schauer points out that such sexual advocacy though abso-
lutely protected, Kingsley International Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684,
688 (1949), "may very well have a long-term effect on sexual morality or conduct
very similar, or perhaps even greater, than explicit depictions of sexual conduct."
Thus, a ban on obscene speech is not likely to be very protective of morality in this
country, even if such a purpose is a legitimate state interest.
7. Justice Brennan noted in Roth that sex "is one of the vital problems of
human interest and public conern." Supra at 487. It is amazing that the courts
have found it so difficult to distinguish between such an important subject and
the "utterly worthless." See n. 13.
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Supreme Court in Roth v. United States8 to avoid the "most
susceptible person" test of Regina v. Hicklin.9 Obscenity is to be
judged based on its appeal to average persons, not just on the
effect of such material on susceptible persons or groups such as
children. But what is an "average" person? It is not the same as
the reasonable man in tort law who is the "ideal" person.
If the sexual sophistication of the reasonable man were as finely tuned
as his judgment and caution, then the major justification for obscenity
laws would disappear, since this 'ideal' would not be aroused by Ulys-
ses or God's Little Acre, and would be merely bored by commercial
pornography.
10
The average person is a composite of all people in a community-
men, women, children, educated, uneducated-with human
weaknesses and strengths. However, Professor Schauer argues
persuasively, the courts should define the average person for the
jury simply by explaining that the purpose behind the concept is
to exclude both the "especially susceptible and the especially
sophisticated."" Furthermore, Professor Schauer points out
that any mention of the fact that children are included in the
composite average person is likely to have a disproportionate
effect on the jury.
The second part of the Miller test requires that the pruriently
appealing material must also be patently offensive; that is, it
must go "substantially beyond customary limits of candor in
describing or presenting [sexual] matter.' 1 2 The applicable law
must specifically describe the type of sexual speech which can be
found patently offensive.
Contemporary community standards are used to define what
is patently offensive. The purpose of the contemporary com-
munity for the Warren court, according to Schauer, was to em-
phasize the temporal aspect of obscenity: What is offensive to the
community today, not yesterday? The Burger court has allowed
the concept to become primarily geographic by rejecting the
national standard as unworkable and substituting local stand-
ards. In Miller the Burger court discounted the harm done to
8. Supra, n. 5.
9. [1868] L.R. 3 Q B. 360.
10. Schauer, Frederick F. THE LAW OF OBSCENITY. Washington: The Bureau
of National Affairs, Inc., 1976, at page 73. (Hereinafter cited as SCHAUER.)
11. SCHAUER, at page 75.
12. A.L.I., Model Penal Code § 251.4 (1) (1962).
national distributors of sexually explicit materials by the multi-
plicity of different local standards. 13
The Court did not discuss the fact that a local community
standard seems to unnecessarily personalize the jury's decision.
If a jury decides that a particular film is not patently offensive in
its community, has it impugned the reputation of its city or state?
Professor Schauer suggests that the defense should attempt to
minimize this problem by stating the issue not as being whether
the community or the average person is offended, "but whether
the community or the average person is offended by the mate-
rials being available to those who wish to see them. ' 14 In other
words, an acquitting jury should not be viewed as being sex-
crazed, only tolerant.
A more important question, in a practical sense, is whether a
"local" standard is any more workable than a "national" stand-
ard. Professor Schauer points out that it is no more feasible to
prove what the communities in the state of California believe to
be patently offensive than to prove the same fact nationally. Most
states passing new legislation have provided for a statewide
definition of obscenity. Only when the community is defined
very narrowly does the feasibility of proof become significant.
Yet, as the number of possible communities increases, so does
the danger to First Amendment rights. All major movies and
books are distributed nationwide. It might be possible for a
distributor to know the different sexual tolerances of the fifty
states and thus avoid breaking the law, but it would be imposs-
ible to know the standard in all counties, let alone all cities,
villages and judicial districts.
Professor Schauer argues that, whatever instructions the jury
is given, it is likely in any event to apply the standards of the
community from which it is drawn. Recognizing this point helps
resolve conflict of laws problems when the offense takes place in
more than one community or state.15 Though the better ap-
13. The Court commented that a local standard will allow a local community
to give a higher level of protection to sexually explicit speech than that given by a
national standard. As Professor Schauer points out, that argument ignores the
fact that a national standard would have set only a minimum with any state or
locality free to set a higher standard in any event. Compare the Court's treatment
of the risk of multiplicity of inconsistent burdens in commerce clause case, Bibb
v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520 (1959).
14. SCHAUER, at page 133.
15. For example, 18 U.S.C. § 1461 makes mailing obscene matter a violation in
every community through which the mail passes. The book does not discuss
whether air mail being flown over a state would be enough. Conflict of laws
problems generally are discussed in Schauer, Obscenity and the Conflict of
Laws, 77 W. Va. L. REv. 377 (1975).
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proach, Professor Schauer argues, would be to apply the law of
the community where the material is actually available to the
public; practically speaking the jury is likely to apply the com-
munity standards of the forum.
The most significant part of the Miller test is its requirement
that even patently offensive, prurient-appealing sexual material
must also be without "serious literary, artistic, political or scien-
tific value." Though less strict than the Warren court's "utterly
without redeeming social value" test,16 the "serious value" test is
more protective of free speech than either of the preceding two
parts of the Miller test. The average man and the local communi-
ty are no longer important: "A finding of serious literary value
should be made . . .where that serious literary value is only
perceivable by a sophisticated (or perhaps unsophisticated) seg-
ment of the population."17 Thus, expert testimony is extremely
important as to this part of the test, particularly for the defense.1 8
Professor Schauer suggests this approach:
[I]f material has serious literary value for a significant portion of the
population, then the fact that this portion is neither average nor in the
majority is irrelevant .... If a work is a serious literary endeavor with
the purpose of stimulating the mind, and if it has this effect on a
significant number of people, then literary value exists, and there can
be no finding of obscenity.'9
Though Professor Schauer states that intent is the crucial deter-
mination, he does not believe that good intent alone is a complete
defense.20
16. The exact phrase was first used in Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S.
413, 418 (1966), but the concept was endorsed by Justice Brennan in Jacobellis v.
Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964). In Memoirs, only 3 justices joined in the plurality
opinion endorsing the "without value" test, but Justices Black and Douglas
argued even that test gave inadequate protection to First Amendment rights. It is
ironic that the Black and Douglas "absolutist" position limited the precedential
value of Memoirs thus making it easier for the Miller court to substitute a
standard less protective of free speech.
17. SCHAUER, at page 144.
18. But Professor Schauer cautions, "Evidence of this sort should be pre-
sented only if there is a likelihood of making a believable case." (p. 274) Other-
wise, the jury "is likely not to believe any of the defense's contentions." (p. 274)
Expert testimony, Professor Schauer states, may be equally valuable in proving
community standards. (p. 131-35)
19. SCHAUER, at page 144.
20. Professor Schauer does not really discuss why good faith intent should
not be a complete defense. In regulating political speech, the court made bad
intent a necessary part of any limitation on political speech, Brandenburg v.
Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
Professor Schauer cautions that superimposed on the Miller
tripartite test "is the requirement that only hard-core pornog-
raphy may be included within the regulation of obscenity."' 21 The
Burger court is in agreement with the Warren court in that
respect. Professor Schauer does not attempt to explain how the
two courts could arrive at such very different definitions of
hard-core pornography. In fact, it appears that with the Burger
court's emphasis on the average man and local communities and
its rejection of the "utterly without redeeming social value" test,
the Miller test would seem to permit the regulation of sexual
material far short of the hard-core.
It is possible that almost any definition of unprotected material
would have the same result. Perhaps that is why many believe
that the most lucid statement by a member of the Court about
pornography is Justice Stewart's clever, "I know it when I see
it."'22 But Justice Stewart intended more than just a quip. His was
a psychological and legal point that there is a distinct difference
between even hard and soft-core pronography and that anyone-
juries, judges, prosecutors-will see it too. A prohibition limited
to hard-core pornography would be easier to enforce, would give
clearer notice to distributors and would be more protective of
legitimate discussions of sex.
The essence of the Warren court's desire to protect all legiti-
mate discussion of sex, however, was the "utterly without re-
deeming social value" test. That test was first developed in
Jacobellis v. Ohio23 though it appears to have had its origins in
New York Times v. Sullivan24 decided earlier the same term. In
the latter landmark free speech case, the Supreme Court held
that even false and defamatory statements were protected:
Speech on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide open
.... The constitutional protection does not turn upon the truth, popu-
larity, or social utility of the ideas and beliefs which are offered. As
Madison said, 'Some degree of abuse is inseparable from the proper use
of everything; and in no instance is this more true than in that of the
press.' . . . [E]rroneous statement is inevitable in free debate, and
[must] be protected if the freedoms of expression are to have the
'breathing space' that the 'need' . . . to survive.
25
The "utterly without redeeming social value" test was an at-
tempt to apply the New York Times approach to obscenity cases.
A free society must take risks including the protection of sexual
21. SCHAUER, at page 109.
22. Jacobellis, supra. at 197. (Stewart, J., concurring).
23. Supra. See, n. 13.
24. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
25. Id. at pp. 270-272. Internal citations omitted.
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speech with even very doubtful value to make sure that all speech
with real value is in fact protected. The Warren court test left
room for error without threatening legitimate speech about such
a fundamental interest as sex. The Miller test leaves no such
room for error. A "no value" test misapplied may reach material
with "no serious value." A "no serious value" test may reach
material with substantial value. But, as Professor Schauer points
out, the trial judge has an important responsibility in every
obscenity case to make an independent determination as to
whether or not the material is hard-core. Only if the judge be-
lieves that it is should he allow the jury to make the same
determination. The appellate courts then must make a final,
independent judgment on this important constitutional issue.
Only by assessing the hard-core aspect of sexually explicit
speech independent of the Miller test will free speech be given
adequate protection.
From the in-depth discussion of the substantive tests of ob-
scenity law, Professor Schauer develops the procedural aspects
of implementing these tests in the courtroom. The book is
oriented toward a practical emphasis of obscenity law. Together
with the in-depth analysis of the relevant Supreme Court tests by
which obscenity standards are to be judged, Professor Schauer
has compiled a most comprehensive reference source which will
provide practicing lawyers with material on all aspects of obs-
cenity cases.
JAMES M. MCGOLDRICK*
* James M. McGoldrick is a professor of Law at Pepperdine University
School of Law.

